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GIMME SHELTER: RELIGIOUS
PROVISION OF SHELTER TO THE
HOMELESS AS A PROTECTED USE
UNDER ZONING LAWS
SUSAN L. GOLDBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in the
amount of attention paid to the issue of homelessness' in our country.
Though increased homelessness has captured public attention,2 it has
* B.A. Tufts University, 1980; J.D. Georgetown University School of Law, 1984;
LL.M. Candidate, May 1986, Temple University, School of Law, Lecturer in Law.
1. One author has defined homelessness as "a condition wherein an individual on a
given night has no place to sleep and is forced to be on the street or seek shelter in a
temporary shelter." Kaufman, Homelessness: A Comprehensive Policy Approach, 17 UR-
BAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE REVIEW 21 (Winter 1984). Other experts define homeless-
ness in this way:
Those whose primary nighttime residence is either in the publicly or privately oper-
ated shelters or in the streets, in the doorways, train stations and parks, subways,
abandoned buildings, loading docks and other well hidden sites known only to
their users.
BAXTER and HOPPER, PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES: HOMELESS ADULTS ON THE
STREETS OF NEW YORK 8-9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BAXTER & HOPPER, PRIVATE
LIVES].
2. See, e.g., Alter, Stille, Doherty, Greenberg, Agrest, Smith, Raine and Junkin,
Homeless in America, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 18, 1985, at 19 [hereinafter cited as
Homeless in America]; Nelson, Street People, THE PROGRESSIVE, March 1985; Wick-
enden, Abandoned Americans, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 18, 1985, at 19; M. HOMBS
& M. SNYDER, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A FORCED MARCH TO NOWHERE [here-
inafter cited as HOMES & SYNDER].
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not yet led to comprehensive governmental planning or funding for
shelters.3 Efforts to assist those in need of shelter have come primarily
from religious organizations.4 Churches5 across the nation have estab-
lished soup kitchens and emergency shelters for those in need. Reli-
gious institutions seeking to expand or convert their basements to
accommodate the need for emergency shelter have been hampered by
both a lack of financial resources and resistance from community
groups and local zoning boards.6 This article's central tenet is that
because of the fundamental religious obligation to shelter the homeless,
providing shelter for those without homes is a valid religious or acces-
sory use of church facilities. Because shelter provision is based on reli-
gious obligations, church efforts to provide shelter are protected by the
first amendment's free exercise clause. Therefore, in a majority of
states, traditional zoning principles are inapplicable. In these states,
the government's interest in regulation of shelters should require a
compelling state interest to overcome the guarantee of the free exercise
clause.
This article examines the interaction between the zoning power of
municipalities and the church's right to use property already devoted
to religious use, for sheltering the homeless. Particular attention will
be accorded the issue of whether use of a religious structure for a "shel-
ter" constitutes a valid religious or accessory use within the free exer-
cise clause of the first amendment.7 This question, arising with
increasing frequency in the courts, has, until now, been handled on an
3. Nelson, supra note 2, at 27-28; Fabricant & Epstein, Legal and Welfare Rights
Advocacy: Complementary Approaches in Organizing on behalf of the Homeless, 17 UR-
BAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE REVIEW 15 (Winter 1984). See also Baxter and Hooper,
Shelter and Housing for the Homeless Mentally Ill, reprinted in THE HOMELESS MEN-
TALLY ILL 111 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984).
4. Fabricant and Epstein, supra note 3, at 15-16. See infra notes 58-77 and accom-
panying text for an explanation of the religious obligation to provide shelter for the
homeless. See also Stoner, An Analysis of Public and Private Sector Provisions for Home.
less People, 17 URBAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE REVIEW 3 (Winter 1984); Homeless in
America, supra note 2, at 21; Leslie, Who is my Brother's Keeper, NEWSWEEK, January
31, 1983, at 28.
5. The term "church" is used here to represent religious organizations of all faiths
and denominations.
6. Kasinitz, Gentrification and Homelessness: The Single Room Occupant and the
Inner City Revival, 17 URBAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE REVIEW 9 (Winter 1984); Home-
less in America, supra note 2, at 26-28; Leslie, supra note 4.
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
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ad hoc basis8 as to whether the shelter is an appropriate use. The usual
problems attendant to case by case adjudication include the expense of
duplicative litigation, uneven results and a possible chilling effect on
those engaging in charitable efforts. Therefore, this article will first
examine the dimensions and nature of the homelessness crisis,9 identi-
fying some of the causes of homelessness as well as recent shifts in the
demographic composition of those in need of emergency shelter. Sec-
ond, the fundamental theological roots, focusing on the central Judeo-
Christian tenet imposing a duty to provide shelter to the homeless, will
be documented.'° Next, the development of zoning laws with regard to
religious use and what constitutes religious and accessory uses will be
examined." The principle, followed by a majority of jurisdictions, of
accommodating religion in light of the free exercise clause, will be ex-
amined in the context of what constitutes valid religious and accessory
uses under zoning ordinances.' 2 The article concludes by arguing that
sheltering the homeless does constitute a valid religious or accessory
use of church property, and therefore, courts should require a compel-
ling state interest before the use is restricted.
13
II. THE CRISIS OF HOMELESSNESS
A. Introduction
Statistics showing that there are from 250,0004 to three million15
homeless people in America indicate that the inherent condition of
homelessness accounts in large part for the wide range in the figures
cited. It is not surprising that researchers have found it impossible to
accurately assess the precise number 6 of homeless in America. The
8. See infra Section VI.
9. See infra Section II.
10. See infra Section III.
11. See infra Section IV.
12. Id.
13. See infra Section V.
14. HUD REPORT ON HOMELESSNESS, BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEv. OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URB. AFFAIRS AND
THE SUBCOMM. ON MANPOWER AND HOUSING OF THE COMM. ON GOV'T. OPERA-
TIONS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 327, 338 (1984) (Report to the Secretary on the Homeless
and Emergency Shelters) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON HOMELESSNESS].
15. HOMBS AND SNYDER, supra note 2; Wickenden, supra note 2, at 20; Homeless
in America, supra note 2.
16. One author remarked as follows: "The fact is that no one knows how many
homeless people there are. At best, it can be determined how many are sheltered on a
19861
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250,000 "floor" figure results from a Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) study, and has been widely criticized by those familiar with the
crisis." Testimony from recent congressional hearings supports the
accusation that the methodology used by HUD was flawed, resulting in
a gross underestimation of the number of homeless in the United
States. 18
Just as counting the homeless is difficult, so to is defining who the
homeless are 9 and determining the causes of their condition.20 There
is no single cause of homelessness. A variety of forces2' combine to
victimize those lacking shelter. Traditionally, streets, bus terminals,
subway stations and park benches were thought to be the provinces of
older alcoholics, the mentally ill and those who chose homelessness as
a way of life.22 Today, in addition to alcohol and drug abuse and dein-
stitutionalization of the mentally ill,23 factors contributing to homeless-
ness include the economic pressures of unemployment and inflation,
given night." Hopper, Whose Lives Are These, Anyway? 17 URBAN AND SOCIAL
CHANGE REVIEWv 13 (Summer 1984).
Members of the District of Columbia Community for Creative Nonviolence (CCNV),
a Washington group that has been a forceful advocate for the homeless by fighting for
shelters, organizing protests and instituting lawsuits, has stated that "we will discover
how many people are on the streets only after they have come inside," In testifying
before the House District Committee, Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Synder (both of
CCNV) answered the question of how many homeless people in this way: "Precisely
how many? Who knows? Certainly not the government. Nor the professionals. Not
the religious community. Not even those who work with the homeless know for sure."
HOMBS AND SYNDER, supra note 2, at 129.
17. See, e.g., Hopper, supra note 16. Hopper points out that HUD teams used
"sleights of hand" and deceptively defined terms leading to lower figures.
18. Wickenden, supra note 2, at 20. Estimating the number of homeless is signifi-
cant because funding and other resources often are allocated on the basis of these
statistics.
19. See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
20. Crystal, Homeless Men and Homeless Women: The Gender Gap, 17 URBAN
AND SOCIAL CHANGE REVIEW 2 (Summer 1984).
21. Hope and Young, The Homeless: On the Street, On the Road, 101 THE CHRIS-
TIAN CENTURY 48 (1984); Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 21.
22. Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 22. See also Fabricant and Epstein, supra
note 3; Sloss, The Crisis ofHomelessness: Its Dimensions and Solutions, 17 URBAN AND
SOCIAL CHANGE REVIEW 18 (Summer 1984); Wickendon, supra note 2, at 20.
23. Problems such as homelessness do not result from deinstitutionalization per se
but instead are a function of the way deinstitutionalization has been implemented.
Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill, reprinted in. THE HOME-
LESS MENTALLY ILL 55 (H.R. Lamb. ed. 1984). Deinstitutionalization will be dis-
cussed in this light throughout the text.
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cutbacks in social services, shortages of affordable housing, and domes-
tic violence and abuse.24
B. Deinstitutionalization-A Failed Promise
In response to criticism of inhumane mental asylum conditions, due
process concerns about commitment procedures, the advent of mood
stabilizing drugs, and incentives to reduce state budgets, large numbers
of mentally ill individuals have been diverted from psychiatric hospi-
tals in the past two decades.25 In theory, community-based organiza-
tions were to supplant hospitals in providing services to those in
need.26 In practice, however, lack of planning, funding cutbacks and
community resistance have combined to prevent this promised fulfill-
ment, 27 resulting in large numbers of homeless mentally ill individu-
als. 28 Additionally, "the condition of living without shelter itself
contributes to mental illness" 29 among the homeless. Statistics indicate
that mentally ill individuals comprise anywhere from twenty to sixty
percent of the homeless in this country.
30
24. For an in depth analysis of each factor see Stoner, The Plight of Homeless Wo-
men, Soc. SERV. REV. (1983). See also Stoner, supra note 4, at 4; HOMBS AND SNY-
DER, supra note 2.
25. See generally THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984); HOMBS
AND SNYDER, supra note 2, at 43-52. Crystal, supra note 20, at 2-3; Collins, Comment:
Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 THE URBAN LAWYER 18-20 (Spring 1984).
26. Collins, supra note 25, at 320; Crystal, supra note 20, at 3; Wickenden, supra
note 2, at 24.
27. Crystal, supra note 20, at 3; Hope and Young, From Back Wards to Back Alley-
ways: Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless, 17 URBAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE RE-
VIEW 7-9 (Summer 1984); Collins, supra note 25, at 320-21. Community resistance to
local facilities often takes the form of restrictions in zoning ordinances. Although the
ordinances may be invalidated, depending on the wording of the ordinance and the
zoning enabling act, facilities for the homeless often lack the resources to challenge
these laws. Id. at 321. It also should be noted that religious organizations often face the
same difficulties with regard to zoning restrictions on shelters for the homeless.
28. See generally HOMBS AND SYNDER, supra note 2, at 43-52; Hope and Young,
supra note 27, at 7.
29. Stoner, An Analysis, supra note 4, at 4.
30. Hope and Young, supra note 27, at 7; HOMBS AND SNYDER, supra note 2, at 6.
See also Arce and Vergave, Identifying and Characterizing the Mentally Ill Among the
Homeless, reprinted in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 88 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984). In
fact, Arce estimated the number of homeless who are mentally ill at 84%. See generally
Arce, Tadlock, Vergrave and Shapiro, A Psychiatric Profile of Street People Admitted to
An Emergency Shelter, 34 HOSPITAL COMM. PSYCHIATRY 812-17 (1983).
For an examination of possible legal theories available to the homeless mentally ill see
Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 939 (1984). The
1986]
Washington University Open Scholarship
80 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 30:75
C. Economic Pressures Causing Homelessness
Economic factors contributing to homelessness include the loss of
employment, loss of social service benefits, inflation and the absence of
decent, affordable housing.31 Many commentators view these as the
primary causes of the lack of shelter.32 Despite the decrease in official
unemployment figures over the past few years, the "trickle down" the-
ory has not been evident on the streets and in the shelters, where many
attribute their homelessness to unemployment.3 When unemploy-
ment and inflation combine with cutbacks in, and elimination of, fund-
ing for social services, victims of such measures often end up on the
streets.34
Lack of affordable housing stems from three separate but related
problems. Low-income housing starts have dwindled;35 urban renewal
and condominium conversion have eliminated existing low cost inner-
city housing;36 and housing shortages have led to rent increases in
other existing housing.37 One author has viewed the lack of affordable
housing as an interplay between the rise in poverty and increased hous-
ing costs, 38 with the gap between the limited ability to pay and the
author posits two possible legal avenues: shelter as an entitlement once it has been
provided through a mental health facility and shelter as a matter of the right to commu-
nity aftercare. Id.
31. See supra note 14.
32. Hope and Young, supra note 21; Wickenden, supra note 2, at 20; Nelson, supra
note 2, at 26.
33. See, e.g., Stoner, supra note 4, at 2-3. Even the discredited HUD study esti-
mates that unemployment causes homelessness for a substantial number of people. See
Report on Homelessness, supra note 14.
34. See generally Hombs and Snyder, Policies that Kill, reprinted in HoMELESSNESS
IN AMERICA: A FORCED MARCH TO NOWHERE 18-42 (1982). Although President
Reagan denied that cutbacks would increase homelessness, in fact, cuts in social services
do account for substantial increases in homelessness. See id. at 18. Since 1981, reduced
assistance levels have been implemented in such government programs as Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children, unemployment benefits, food stamps and child nutrition
programs. See Hartman, Why They Have No Homes, THE PROGRESSIVE, March 1985,
at 26.
35. Hartman, supra note 34, at 27; Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 22-23.
Low income housing construction came to a standstill in the 1970's. This may have
contributed, in part, to the fact that median rent increased twice as fast as personal
income during the same period.
36. See Kasinitz, supra note 6, at 9-14.
37. See Hartman, supra note 35, at 27.
38. Hartman, supra note 35, at 27.
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availability of housing at that price steadily increasing.39 Many impov-
erished individuals end up falling through the ever widening fissures in
our social service system, thus creating newer classes of homeless.
D. The Homeless-Changing Demographics
As the causes of homelessness have changed, so too have the victims.
The average age of those without shelter has dropped to under forty.
Providers of food and shelter have noted dramatic increases in the
number of women, children and whole families seeking emergency
assistance.' Two major reasons explain increases in homelessness
among these groups: some are homeless because of economic disas-
ter;4 1 others ran away or were "pushed out" of homes where there was
violence or abuse.42
E. The Response-Shelters and Shelter Providers 43
Both the public and private sectors have responded to the homeless-
39. Id. "Homelessness is, in sum, simply an extreme manifestation of poverty, and
homelessness is on the rise because poverty is too. Economic pressures on the poor and
near poor are intensifying while housing costs continue to climb. The result is an ever-
widening gap between the shelter people can afford and the shelter people need." Hart-
man, supra note 34, at 27, Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 22; Sloss, supra note
22, at 18.
40. Nelson, supra note 2, at 28; Stoner, supra note 4, at 3.
41 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 28. See also Arce and Vergave, Identifying and
Characterizing the Mentally Ill Among the Homeless, reprinted in THE HOMELESS MEN-
TALLY ILL 76 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984).
42. Stoner, supra note 4, at 1. Stoner reports:
A growing number of homeless women and adolescent females report that they fled
from their homes after repeated incidents of spousal abuse, rape, incest and deser-
tion. Cuts in expenditures for welfare programs feature severe slashes in provisions
for battered females and displaced homemakers who feature predominantly among
data about the growing phenomenon of the "feminization of poverty."
Id.
For a report on homeless youth, see REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITU-
TION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOMELESS YOUTH: THE SAGA OF "PUSHOuTS"
AND THROWAWAYS IN AMERICA (1980).
43. This article's focus is only on emergency shelter for the homeless. It is
recognized, however, that this type of shelter is but one small temporary step in
eliminating homelessness and does not begin to address long term needs or solutions.
Experts in the field recommend a three tier approach to providing assistance to the
homeless. The first step, and the only one specifically addressed in this article, is the
provision of emergency shelter and food. Transitional shelters, the second phase,
recognize the need for continuing support services while advocating responsibility and
eventual independence. Assistance would include help in securing permanent housing,
19861
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ness crisis. Where they exist, public provisions for shelter usually take
one of two forms. The first form, single room occupant (SRO) vouch-
ers, provide the individual with overnight accommodations in low-cost
hotels in various states of disrepair, which one author alleged are
among "the most squalid conditions of the housing market."' 44 The
alternative public offering consists of even less attractive public shel-
ters, which are overcrowded, 45 understaffed, dehumanizing and dan-
gerous.46 Public shelters often are used as a last resort, after SROs and
private shelters have reached their nightly capacity.47
The vast majority of assistance for the homeless comes from private
organizations. 48 There are two types of private shelters: large shelters,
usually run by missions, and small shelters that have been established
through ad hoc efforts of local churches and nonprofit groups. 49 The
large mission shelters present the same shortcomings as public shel-
ters.50 In general, smaller shelters are more humane than larger shel-
ters. 1 Because of this, smaller shelters reach capacity quickly and
governmental benefits and counseling. The third tier, long term residences, would
actually provide stabilization and independent living in the form of group homes or
individual apartment units. Low income housing and support personnel would be
integral parts of this ideal three phase comprehensive system. See Baxter and Hopper,
supra note 3, at 129-30; Stoner, supra note 4, at 7-8; Kaufman, supra note 1, at 22-24;.
44. Kasinitz, supra note 6, at 13.
45. Stoner, supra note 4, at 5.
46. Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 22-23; HoMBS AND SYNDER, supra note
2, at 130. Hombs and Snyder remark:
[B]y any rational and humane standards, the conditions prevailing within the two
[District of Columbia] municipal shelters for men are completely intolerable and
unacceptable. Despite the waste, the filth, the mismanagement, the theft, the dehu-
manization and the brutality, we fight to keep them open. Why? Because for those
who are willing to use the shelters, in spite of the conditions, the alternative is so
much worse.
Id.
47. Some homeless individuals refuse to use public shelters even if no other shelter
is available for fear that they will become victims of the crime which pervades the shel-
ters. See Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 22.
48. Emergency Assistance Programs: An Exploratory Survey, UNITED WAY OF Los
ANGELES (1983); Stoner, supra note 4, at 5-6.
49. See Emergency Assistance Programs, supra note 48.
50. Stoner, supra note 4, at 6.
51. Id. Stoner found that:
Provisions in the larger missions vary little from those in New York's public shel-
ters. Intake and admissions procedures are demanding and judgmental ... there is
no doubt that these traditional shelters function on a humane basis. Nevertheless,
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often have high turnaway rates.5 2 Because private shelters operate on
voluntary contributions they have limited resources.5 3 The per person
operating costs for these organizations, however, tend to be substan-
tially lower than for public shelters. 54  Religious institutions
predominate the field. 5 A study done by the Los Angeles chapter of
the United Way found that religious organizations provided two-thirds
of the emergency assistance programs offered in their geographic
area. 6 Although many churches have recognized a religious obliga-
they do reflect many of the harsh and punitive attitudes which society holds against
the homeless.
Id. Small religious providers are often the most effective and compassionate. Hope and
Young observe that:
The best shelters are small, are sponsored by the parish and reflect that commu-
nity's concern. Such refuges are quietly opening up all over the country.... In
reality, most clients and shelter providers-and even many public officials-agree
that private and religious sectors can do a better job than the city. Their shelters
are less bureaucratic; the staff is motivated by the belief that before God every
human being has worth....
Hope and Young, supra note 21, at 58.
52. Bassuk and Lauriat, The Politics of Homelessness, reprinted in THE HOMELESS
MENTALLY ILL 307 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984); Hope and Young, supra note 21; Stoner,
supra note 4.
53. Stoner, supra note 4, at 6.
54. Homeless in America, supra note 2, at 23. Lower costs result from volunteer
staff, donation of food and supplies, and the provision of no formal psychiatric or social
work services. Id. See Wickenden, supra note 2, at 21-25. Some private religious shel-
ters report costs as low as one or two dollars a day per client; public shelters usually
cost from ten to twenty dollars a day per client, and SRO facilities can run even higher.
Hope and Young, supra note 21, at 51.
55. Emergency Assistance Programs, supra note 48. Although these facilities are
operated by religious organizations, that does not mean they require religious adherence
on the part of the recipients of shelter. "Although a few Salvation Army missions still
require a sermon for supper, most directors have come to the conclusion that you can-
not force religion on others." Hope and Young, supra note 21, at 50.
56. Emergency Assistance Programs, supra note 48. One expert believes that this
figure is representative of cities nationwide, excluding only New York City. Stoner,
supra note 4, at 5. New York is excluded because a consent decree issued in the case of
Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 26, 1981) established a
right to shelter in New York under the New York State Constitution, Social Services
Law and City Administrative Code. The New York State Constitution reads: "[T]he
aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state
and by such of its subdivisions .. " N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. See also N.Y. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. A, § 604-1.0(b) (1978).
Under the decree, sanitary and safe shelter, including board, security and supervision,
are to be provided for each person who meets need standards set by New York, or who
is in need of temporary shelter due to physical, mental or social problems. The original
consent decree applied only to men, but the National Coalition for the Homeless filed a
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tion to provide for those in need, thus opening shelters in response to
the growing homelessness crisis, some church and community leaders
have called for still more aid from religious organizations.57 As reli-
gious communities increasingly recognize a duty to shelter the home-
less, conflicts with government zoning laws arise. Therefore, as
religious organizations seek to fulfill their duty to shelter the homeless,
one can predict new and continuing conflicts. The next section of this
article examines the fundamental nature of the duty to provide shelter
to the homeless, as perceived by the religious providers.
III. SHELTERING THE HOMELESS: A BASIC OBLIGATION OF
ADHERENTS OF THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN FAITHS
Fundamental to Judeo-Christian5" religious tenets is the obligation
class action suit that led to a determination that the decree was to apply to women also.
See Eldridge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1983).
Unfortunately, the city often has lagged in compliance with the provisions of the
consent decree. The National Coalition for the Homeless currently is suing the City of
New York for its failure to limit the number of persons accommodated in each shelter
to 200. Nelson, supra note 2, at 28.
The right to shelter also has been established in West Virginia, where the state
supreme court has required adult protective services be extended to the homeless.
Hodge v. Ginsburg, 303 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1983). Suits also have been filed in New
Jersey, Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, No. 1836-84e (N.J. Super. filed Feb. 7, 1984);
Connecticut, Lubetkin v. Hartford (Conn. Super. Ct.) (filed Feb. 3, 1984); and Califor-
nia, Ross v. Bd. of Supervisors (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 11, 1984). See also BAXTER
AND HOPPER, supra note 3, at 130.
For other statutorily enacted duties, see DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 31, § 501 (1975); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980). See also Note, Shelter for the Homeless, 50
BROOKLYN L. REv. 939, 944-47 (1984).
Although the right to shelter, if established, may lead to a minimum level of provision
of basic necessities, a state by state determination of their constitutional and public
assistance provisions would be necessary.
57. In calling for additional assistance from religious organizations, Mayor Koch
inquired as follows: "What is the traditional role of synagogues and churches, if not to
house the homeless?" See Who Is My Brother's Keeper?, NEWSWEEK, January 3, 1983.
See also Editorial, D. Peerman, The Christian Century March 9, 1983, at 207; Bernar-
din, America's Social Sin, COMMONWEALTH September 24, 1982, at 484. Reverend
Bemardin quoted the Holy Father's "Yankee Stadium" address: "We cannot stand idly
by enjoying our own riches and freedom, if, in any place, the Lazarus of the twentieth
century stands at our doors. In light of the parable of Christ, riches and freedom mean
a special responsibility." See id. at 489.
58. Although this analysis focuses on Judeo-Christian tenets, providing for the poor
is also "one of the essentials" of the Islamic faith. See S. KoTB, SOCIAL JUsTICE IN
ISLAM 73 (J. Hardie trans. 1970). Charity is required of believers, and is deemed to be a
sign of "religious sincerity and depth of conscience." Id. at 74-75.
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to provide charity to those who lack life's basic necessities.59 One au-
thor alleges that the failure to make charitable contributions to the
needy "is the failure to obey a commandment of God and is thus a sin
against God, but it is also to deprive other men of what they are due as
a result of God's command, and is thus a sin against man ... the two
cannot be separated."' The duty to aid those in need has been recog-
nized since ancient times.6 The New Testament teachings on charity
emphasize the importance of giving alms.62 Lest the reader begin to
think that charity is encouraged as a social good: "Give to everyone
that asks thee, and do not refuse, for the Father's will is that we give to
all from the gifts we have received" (emphasis added).63 Among those
obtaining special status as assistance recipients are widows,64 or-
phans,65 the poor, 6 6 sojourners, 67 strangers68 and the homeless. 69
59. Basic necessities may be interpreted as food, clothing and shelter. In Politics of
Homelessness, reprinted in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984), Bas-
suk and Lauriat claim that the Salvation Army is the prime example of a religious group
following the Judeo-Christian tradition of aiding the homeless by providing such neces-
sities.
See generally W. PILGRIM, GOOD NEWS TO THE POOR (1981); J. PRITCHARD, AN-
CIENT NEAR EASTERN TExTS 36 (1955); R. SIDER, RICH CHRISTIANS IN AN AGE OF
HUNGER: A BIBLICAL STUDY (1977); D'Arcy, Worthy of Worship-A Catholic Contri-
bution, reprinted in RELIGION AND MORALITY (G. Outka and J. Reeder eds. 1973).
60. D'Arcy, supra note 59, at 142.
61. See A. GEORGE, J. DUPONT, S. LEGASSE, GOSPEL POVERTY: ESSAYS IN BIBLI-
CAL THEOLOGY 12 (1977).
62. "The height to which charity leads is inexpressible. Charity unites us with God
Charity endures all things .... By charity were the elect of God made perfect.
Without it nothing is pleasing and acceptable in the sight of God." 1 Clement NEW
TESTAMENT APOCRYPHA, 21:3-8. "Above all things put on charity, which is the hand
of perfectness." COLONIANS, iii, 14.
63. TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES 1 (2nd cent.).
64. R. SIDER, supra note 59, at 78; see also Exodus 22:20-23; Deuteronomy 10:17-18.
65. GEORGE, DUPONT, LEGASSE, supra note 61, at 12; Exodus 22:20-23. In Islam,
those that "repulse the orphan" are viewed as having repudiated their faith. See KOTB,
supra note 58, at 63.
66. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 24:10-21, 26:12-13; Proverbs 14:21-31, 19:17. See also
PILGRIM, supra note 59, at 74-75.
67. The stranger and the sojourner were often one and the same; a traveler stopping
briefly and then continuing on his journey. "I am a stranger and a sojourner with you."
Genesis 23:4. "If a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him ...
thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." Leviticus
19:33-34; Deuteronomy 10:17-18. See SIDER, supra note 59, 83-84.
Today's sanctuary movement for political refugees also has its roots in Judeo-Chris-
tian theology. The movement may derive its support from Biblical commands regard-
ing the sojourner and stranger. Additional support is derived from the duty to love
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The duty to shelter the homeless therefore can be seen as a basic and
fundamental part of religious obligation in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion.7° Both the Old and the New Testaments contain directives to
provide refuge for the homeless. 71 For example, the Book of Isaiah
states: "Is not this fact that I choose: to loose the bonds of wicked-
ness, to undo the thongs of the yoke, to let the oppressed go free, and to
break every yoke? Is it not to share your bread with the hungry, and
bring the homeless into your house."72 Luke, in obeying the religious
mandate to care for those in need, stated: "Go out quickly into the
streets and lanes of the city and bring in the poor and the maimed and
the halt, and the blind... and compel them to come in, that my house
may be filled." 73 Jesus himself was described as homeless. He had no
one's neighbor. See, eg., Jorstad, Sanctuary for Refugees: A Statement on Public Pol-
icy, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY March 14, 1984, at 275.
A national sanctuary defense fund has been established by the Franciscan Friars;
sanctuary workers use religious teachings as support. There is, however, an analytical
distinction between the sanctuary movement and shelters for the homeless. While reli-
gious convictions may lead churches to engage in both activities, current immigration
laws forbid individual determinations of the granting of asylum. The courts grant great
deference to legislative determinations involving foreign policy matters. See, e.g., Ros-
teker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306 (1979). The fact that immigration matters involve
political decisions impacting on foreign affairs likely would result in a compelling state
interest overriding any stricter standard of review. These types of concerns are not
present when considering shelters for the homeless, and, therefore, the analysis cannot
be treated in the same manner as one would analyze shelter for refugees.
68. Matthew 25:35, "For I was hungry and ye gave me meat, I was thirsty, and ye
gave me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in;" Hebrews 8:2, "Be not forgetful to
entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares;" Leviticus
25:35, "you shall maintain him, as a stranger and a resident alien he shall live with you."
(emphasis added). OGLETREE, HOSPITALITY TO A STRANGER (1985), and J. KOENIG,
WELCOMING THE STRANGER: NEW TESTAMENT HOSPITALITY FOR THE CONTEMPO-
RARY CHURCH (1985), explore the concept of hospitality in the New Testament. See
also J. ELLIOTT, A HOME FOR THE HOMELESS, 146-47 (1981).
In the Islamic religion, Allah requires that a stranger be treated like one's relatives,
and is entitled to receive charity. KOTB, supra note 58, at 81.
69. C. BOERMA, THE RICH, THE POOR AND THE BIBLE 49 (1980). Originally,
provisions for the homeless may have been derived from the obligation to offer hospital-
ity to the stranger or sojourner, who was without an available home of his own.
70. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
71. See Isaiah 14:30, 58:6-9; Job 31:16-22; Matthew 25:35.
In the Islamic faith, the residents of Medina took in the homeless and shared with
them. See KOTB, supra note 58, at 76.
72. Isaiah, 58:3-7 (emphasis added). See SIDER, supra note 59, at 81.
73. Luke 14:21-23.
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roof over his head, nor did he have a bed on which to sleep.74
If assistance is not rendered, or if it is undermined by oppression of
the poor, the Bible teaches that those who fail to act will be rejected as
religious hypocrites. 5 Those who fail to obey the command to shelter
the homeless face condemnation and retribution.76 The Bible states:
"If I have seen any perish for want of clothing or any poor without
covering; ... then let my arm fall from my shoulder blade and my arm
be broken from the bone."
7
Because of the religious command to shelter the homeless, ecclesias-
tic organizations have taken the lead in providing lodging for those in
need. The theological underpinning of what at first glance appears to
be a charitable impulse is actually the fulfillment of a course of conduct
mandated by, and central to, both the Jewish and the Christian faiths.
IV. RELIGOUS AND ACCESSORY UsEs-AN OVERVIEW
A. Religous Use
The question of what constitutes a religious use under zoning laws
involves a complex analysis of first amendment guarantees and the le-
gitimate planning and protective purposes inherent in municipal zon-
ing powers.78 Problems of religious uses conflicting with municipal
zoning ordinances arise because, in most states, religious uses are per-
ceived as contributing to public welfare and morals.79 Furthermore,
74. Luke 2:7-17, 9:58; Matthew 8:20.
75. SIDER, supra note 59, at 80-81; PILGRIM, supra note 59, at 29.
76. Id.
77. Isaiah, 58:3-7 (emphasis added).
78. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Walker, What Constitutes a Reli-
gious Use for Zoning Purposes?, 27 CATH. LAW. 129 (Spring 1982). See also Note,
Judicial Definition of Religous Use In Zoning Cases, URB. LAW ANN. 291 (1973); An-
not., 62 A.L.R.3d 197 (1975).
79. Some zoning ordinances permit "educational, religious or philanthropic use."
See Schueller v. Bd. of Adjustment, 250 Iowa 706, 95 N.W. 2d 731 (1959). Others
allow "religious uses." See Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d
312, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1971); still others allow use for "religious purposes."
See First Free Methodist Church v. Upper Dublin Township, 76 Montg. Co. LR 316
(Pa. 1959).
Courts repeatedly emphasize the purpose and moral value of religious institutions. A
religious use's contribution to public welfare is regarded as beyond discussion or dis-
pute. "Fostering rather than hindering such uses is considered to be established pol-
icy." 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 12.18, at 442 (2d ed. 1976). See
also Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. 1956). But cf Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of
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the first amendment free exercise clause protects religious uses."0
A religious use might be in conflict with a municipality's zoning plan
or the goals incorporated in local ordinances." Typical conflicts are
neighbors claiming that a religious use: increases congestion or leads
to additional noise and traffic, 2 imposes an additional tax burden on
the community, 3 changes the character of their neighborhood, 4 or
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d
823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949) (minority view, which
treats religious organizations the same as all other uses).
80. The first amendment has been held incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
and thus applicable to the states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
81. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Zoning laws are enacted under state police powers,
Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188, and usually are favored with a presumption of constitutionality
when enacted to carry out legitimate state interests. State police powers typically in-
clude the power to zone for public health, safety and welfare. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-
89, 395; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
When a fundamental right is implicated, however, a strict standard of review may be
applied. See:Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating zoning
ordinance that used restrictive definition of family because it violated fundamental
rights). Because the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion is an express
constitutional right, and therefore a fundamental right, it follows that the state would
need a compelling interest in order to regulate religious conduct. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-24 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).
The analysis is complicated further because religious institutions are viewed as contrib-
uting to benefit the public welfare and morals, thereby eliminating some of the tradi-
tional grounds for regulation. See Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 526, 136 N.E.2d
at 836-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
82. See, ag., Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1956); Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup.
Ct. 1968); R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.22, at 454. Although traffic and conges-
tion are legitimate objects of zoning regulations, many courts have downplayed the sig-
nificance of these factors as applied to church properties.
Whether or not zoning laws are permitted to restrict the use of religious property,
private residents still may employ restrictive covenants to limit the uses of land. Courts
generally have been willing to enforce restrictive covenants that exclude churches from
particular neighborhoods. See Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Salem,
254 N.Y. 161, 172 N.E. 455 (Ct. App. 1930). In fact, courts will enforce such covenants
even if the applicable zoning ordinance expressly permits such use. See Strauss v. Ginz-
berg, 218 Minn. 57, 15 N.W.2d 130, (1944).
83. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.18, at 444. This argument rarely will suc-
ceed, particularly in light of the fact that the tax exempt determination made by the
federal government embodies a policy decision on a national level. Id. at 443.
84. Id., § 12.24, at 457. Anderson states:
[Tihe courts have not been impressed with proof that a religious use would disturb
the peace and quiet of a residential neighborhood or deprive it of its residential
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decreases the value of their property. 85 The quandary is how to ad-
dress community concerns and zoning ordinance mandates while rec-
ognizing the constitutionally protected status of religious organizations
and honoring the first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion.
In general, religious uses of property are "in some degree protected
from the full impact of zoning restrictions.86 Although religious orga-
nizations are not completely immune from zoning laws or regula-
tions,87 the need for central, residential location has set religious uses
apart and justified special treatment." 88 One expert notes the tradi-
tional view of the church as merely constituting a place for weekly
prayers has changed significantly over the years.8
9
character. Even when those factors were found acting in concert to change the
character of a neighborhood, the courts have not always been so impressed as to
approve the exclusion of a religious use.
See also Congregation Committee, North Fort Worth Congregation, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
85. Id. Anderson also states:
[T]he courts have said that while the location of religious uses may be regulated in
the proper case, the freedom of religious and other first amendment rights rise
above mere property rights, and far above public inconvenience, annoyance or in-
vest. An adverse effect in property values is an insufficient reason for denial of a
permit to establish a religious use; the high purpose and moral values of a religious
use outweigh mere pecuniary loss to a few persons.
Id. at 453. See also Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Bd. of
Appeals, 25 Ill.2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962); West Chester Reform Temple v. Brown,
22 N.Y. 2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Diocese of Roches-
ter, I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
86. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.18, at 442; Brindel, Zoning Out Religious
Institutions, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 627 (1957).
87. 2 A.R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.18, at 444. Even when a municipality
cannot exclude a religious use, the institution will be subject to normal fire laws, build-
ing codes and other reasonable regulations. City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115,
183 S.W.2d 415 (1944).
88. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.18, at 444. Anderson notes that a central
location is crucial because of service to only a limited area and the need for a central
location for "civic and charitable" organizations. Id. Although cars and mass trans-
portation may weaken this necessity, some religions prohibit driving or riding during
the Sabbath. Therefore, despite technological advances, religious tenets still may man-
date a central location for the religious facilities.
89. A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING at § 20.03 (4th ed.
1979). "The concept of what constitutes a church has changed from a place of worship
alone, used once or twice a week, to a church used the entire week, nights as well as day,
for various parochial and community functions. . . .The question arises as to the ex-
tent to which the additional activities are covered by the cloak of immunity that tradi-
tionally has been extended to the church." See Unitarian Universals Church v. Shorten,
63 Misc.2d 978, 324 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1970)
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Although courts have held that churches may be regulated in proper
situations, religious freedom rises above "mere property rights, public
inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."9 Courts accommodate the com-
peting interests by balancing the advantages of religious uses with the
municipality's need to control land use.91
We now turn our focus to cases involving an alleged religious use in
an area allowing churches or religious groups, either through permis-
sive zoning or special or conditional permits.92 Although cases are
fact-specific and based on local ordinances and state judicial interpreta-
tion, several general approaches are identifiable.93
Texas courts exemplify the most restrictive approach.9 4 The lower
90. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.21, at 453 (citing Columbus Park Congre-
gation of Jehovah's Witness, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 25 Ill.2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962);
In re Garden City Jewish Center, 2 Misc.2d 1009, 155 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1956); State ex rel.
Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 115 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1953)).
91. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.18, at 444. See also Jewish Reconstruc-
tionist Synagogue, Inc. v. Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283,379 N.Y.S.2d 747,342 N.E.2d
534, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
92. Because the focus of this article is a determination of religious or accessory use
after a church has located in a given area, the issue is not how the church was granted
the right to build in a given area. Municipalities, however, use a number of zoning
techniques to further the goals of the plan while still maintaining flexibility. See 2 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 9.18, at 134. Some of these techniques include special
permits, designed to permit special uses of land after administrative determination that
there will be only minimal adverse impact in the surrounding neighborhood. Id.; 6 P.
ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 44.01 (1985); see also Note, The Use
and Abuse of the Special Permit in Zoning Law, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 258, (1969).
Special exceptions may be granted when application of a rule imposes unnecessary
hardship for an individual. 3A RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1
(4th ed. 1979). Conditional use permits also may be issued, allowing use of property
subject to certain restrictions, regardless of whether that use was specifically provided
for under the zoning ordinance. After a plot is given a conditional use permit, the land
usually is re-zoned to include the conditional use. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79,
§ 9.20, at 135-40; C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGIES AND TACTICS IN MUNICIPAL ZONING
196-97 (2d ed. 1979).
Variances are authorizations from the administrative council to depart from the zon-
ing ordinance's requirements. Variances run with the land and are applicable to subse-
quent purchasers. Usually, in order for a variance to be granted, the landowner must
prove both hardship, and that no use contrary to public welfare will result.
93. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different
approaches to religious use.
94. See Note, supra note 78, at 294. New Jersey similarly restricts the definition of
religious use. Id. In one case, a New Jersey state court denied an application to con-
struct a mikvah in a residential neighborhood. Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85
A.2d 833 (1951), afl'd, 21 N.J. Super 329, 91 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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courts in Texas narrowly construe the meaning of religious use.95 In
Coe v. City of Dallas,96 the Dallas zoning board determined that 2400
square feet of healing rooms and 600 square feet of sanctuary did not
constitute a church. The court upheld the zoning board's decision.97
Nontraditional prayer healing activity to be conducted on the site may
have resulted in the board's decision to deny a building permit even
though appellants planned to construct prayer rooms and hold regular
congregational services.9 8
Pennsylvania courts approach the problem somewhat differently;
they look at the use's purpose to determine whether the conduct in
question constitutes a "religious use" of the property.9 9 Under this
analysis, if the purpose is found to be secular, the zoning ordinance will
be upheld."° Thus, a cemetery was found to be a secular use because
mere ownership of land by a religious entity does not render the pro-
posed use religious in nature.'0° Under the same test, a religious, for-
1952). For a contrary decision in New York, see Mikvah of South Shore Congregation,
Inc. v. Granito, 78 A.D.2d 855, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 638 (1980). Later cases from New Jersey
indicate, however, that the courts there no longer narrowly construe these items. In
fact, one of the two cases holding that the provision of shelter for the homeless is a valid
religious or accessory use of church facilities is a New Jersey decision. See St. John's
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (1983).
California is most restrictive regarding whether churches may be excluded from cer-
tain areas. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949). See also Comment, Zoning the Church:
Toward a Concept of Reasonableness, 12 CONN. L. REV. 571 (1980). In City of Chula
Vista v. Pagard, 97 Cal. App. 3d 627, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App. 1979), vacated, 115
Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (Ct. App. 1981), the California Court of Appeals
held that a zoning ordinance survived a free exercise challenge, finding that "[t]he pro-
posal to use a particular property as situs for the practices of a religious belief does not
cloth that property with immunity or authorize non-conformity to zoning laws." 159
Cal. Rptr. at 38. While this case is inapplicable to this discussion because it dealt with a
household, rather than a religious organization, it illustrates the restrictive view Califor-
nia courts take regarding zoning religious organizations.
95. Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
96. 266 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. Civ. App 1953).
97. Id.
98. Id. See Walker, supra note 78, at 162-64. Walker argues that Coe is representa-
tive of cases taking a narrow view of what constitutes religious activity under a given
zoning ordinance. Id. at 162.
99. See generally Note, Church Zoning in Pennsylvania, 22 U. PiTr. L. REV. 591
(1961); Walker, supra note 78, at 160-62.
100. In Re Russian Orthodox Church, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959).
101. Id. Justice McBride, dissenting, pointed out that whether the cemetery was
found to be a religious use hinged on whether the ordinance was broadly or narrowly
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profit radio station was held not to be a religious use.1 0 2 In contrast,
the use of property to lodge traveling missionaries, conduct office work
and hold religious classes was found to be a religous use meeting the
definition of a church, 10 3 as was the use of property for a religious
retreat house for the Franciscan Fathers. In this case the court found
that the term "church" was to be broadly construed to include "any
purpose connected with the religious practices which the group or sect
maintaining that particular church desires to pursue."''4
A third approach in determining whether the proposed activity is a
religious use focuses on the type of structure involved.'05 In Portage
Township v. Full Salvation Union,' ° 6 camp meetings requiring the use
of tents and shacks were found to violate the local zoning ordinance.1
0 7
In another case, the proposed use of a residential dwelling as a mikvah
(ritual bath) was denied, even though the ordinance allowed churches
in a residential area.108
One state court has explicitly called for a balancing test when deter-
mining whether a proposed use should be allowed. In City of Sumner
v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, °9 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton concluded that a vacation bible school is an integral part of the
church's religious faith.'"° Although the court recognized the munici-
construed. He would "operate in favor of liberty" and allow the use because "according
to the tenets, precepts or ecclesiastical law of a religious faith the act of burial is a
religious rite, such cemetery constitute a religious use of land permitted by the ordi-
nance." Id. at 134, 152 A.2d at 493.
102. Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 32 Pa. D & C. 2d 669 (Dist. & County
Ct. 1963). See also Walker, supra note 98, at 160-61.
103. Conversion Center v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. 306, 278 A.2d
369 (1971).
104. In re Stark, 72 Pa. D & C. 168, 189 (1950).
105. See Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297
(1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 851 (1948), reh'g denied, 334 U.S. 830 (1948).
106. 318 Mich. 693, 699-700, 29 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1947).
107. The shacks did not meet local building code standards for construction, sanita-
tion and facilities. Id. Defendants' argument was, in effect, that the structure should be
categorized as a church because the meeting was held for religious purposes. Id. The
court concluded, however, that not every place where religious services are held is a
church. Id. The court ultimately held that the meetings constituted a nuisance. Id. at
703, 29 N.W.2d at 302.
108. Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85 A.2d 833 (1951), afl'd, Sexton v. Essex
County Ritualarium, 21 N.J. Super. 329, 91 A.2d 162 (1952).
109. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
110. Id.
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pality's right to enact zoning requirements in the interest of health,
safety and welfare, it required the state to be flexible and to weigh the
church's first amendment interests before restricting the use.11 1
Other state courts take the approach that facilities are an integral
part of church functioning and cannot be excluded if the church itself
is permitted.'12 Under this approach, religious schools,1 13 a "sisters'
home" for the church school's teachers. 14 and a dormitory for married
graduate students at a church school115 have all been upheld as reli-
gious uses.
The most inclusive view of religious uses is best exemplified by the
approach taken by New York courts, which broadly view religious use
as "conduct with religious purpose." ' 1 6 One commentator has inter-
preted this phrase to include "any conduct which is in accordance with
the doctrines, practices or regulations of a religious organization." 1 7
11. Id. at 7-8, 639 P.2d at 1362-63. The court used the standard enunciated in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), requiring a compelling state interest and the
least restrictive means of achieving the public interest. 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at
1363-64. "In the final analysis, accommodation between the competing interests must
be the goal. Only if such accommodation is not possible should one legitimate interest
overrule the other." Id.
112. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 575-76, 448 P.2d 185 (Idaho 1968); Bd. of Zoning
Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 346-47, 172 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind. 1961); Board of
Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 45-47, 76 N.E.2d 597, 600-01 (Ind. App.
1948); Scott Co. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop for Diocese of Oregon, 83 Or. 97, 163
P. 88, 91-92 (1917). See Note, supra note 78, at 294.
113. 241 Ind. at 346-47, 172 N.E.2d at 42; City of Concord v. New Testament Bap-
tist Church, 118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377, 379-80 (1980).
114. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1948).
115. Schueller v. Bd. of Adjustment, 250 Iowa 706, 709, 95 N.W.2d 731, 733
(1959). The ordinance at issue in Schueller allowed "educational, religious or philan-
thropic use, excluding business school and college in correctional institutions." Id. at
711, 95 N.W.2d at 735. The court found that the dormitory was a proper educational
and religious use. Id.
116. Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 316, 319
N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79,
§ 12.25, at 458-60; Walker, supra note 78, at 170-83; Note, supra note 78, at 291; Com-
ment, Zoning the Church: Toward A Concept of Reasonableness, 12 CONN. L. REv. 571,
577-86 (1980).
Anderson cites cases decided by the state courts of Indiana, Oregon and Ohio as
adhering to the New York view. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.25, at 459-60.
See also Corp. of Presiding Bishops v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185 (1968);
Mahrt v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 5, 142 N.E.2d 567 (C.P.
1955).
117. Note, supra note 78, at 292.
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As noted in Community Synagogue v. Bates,118
A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the op-
portunity to worship God. Strictly religious uses and activities are
more than prayer and sacrifice, and all churches recognize that the
area of their responsibility is broader than leading the congrega-
tion in prayer. Churches have always developed social groups for
adult and youth where the fellowship of the congregation is
strengthened with the result that the parent church is strength-
ened. We find evidence of this in the Old Testament.... To limit
a church as being merely a house of prayer and sacrifice would, in
a large degree, be depriving the church of this opportunity of en-
larging, perpetuating and strengthening itself and the congrega-
tion .... Each case ultimately rests on its own facts.11 9
Stated simply, activity related to the purpose of a religious organiza-
tion is a religious use. 2 In Diocese of.Rochester v. Planning Board, 2'
a companion case to Bates, the court spoke of the high moral purposes
of religious organizations, and ruled that diminished neighborhood
property values, decreased enjoyment of surrounding lots, increased
traffic and loss of tax revenues were insufficient grounds to bar church
facilities from a neighborhood.'22 The court further found that reli-
gious activities encompassed more than just prayers. 123
The post-Bates decisions occurred in two phases. 24 The first stage
included cases that involved religious uses directly benefitting the reli-
gious organization's members. 125  In one case, radio and television
broadcasts were held to be religious uses because these activities ful-
filled the religion's mandate to spread the faith's beliefs.' 26 Another
118. I N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
119. Id. at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22. See also 2 R. ANDER-
SON, supra note 79, § 12.25, at 460.
120. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.25, at 460.
121. 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
122. Id. at 524-25, 136 N.E.2d at 835-36, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
123. Id. at 525-26, 136 N.E.2d at 836, 154 N.Y.S. 2d at 862. In Rochester, the court
found a parish house and convent to be religious uses of church and school property.
Id. (quoting Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Indianapolis v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 47,
76 N.E.2d 597, 601 (1948)).
124. Note, supra note 78, at 293.
125. Id.
126. In re Faith for Today, Inc., 11 A.D. 2d 718, 719, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (App.
Div. 1960). See also Note, supra note 78, at 293.
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case in this stage permitted sisterhood and men's club meetings.1 2 7
In the second phase, New York courts held that religious use in-
cludes activities benefitting more than just the congregants of that par-
ticular group.'2 8 One of these cases involved a day care center.
129
Another involved a Sunday center for performing arts. 30 In both of
these cases the courts held that the state interests did not meet the
"stricter scrutiny" required when constitutionally protected religious
and educational institutions are involved.' In North Shore Hebrew
Academy v. Wegman, 132 the court rejected the evidence presented by
neighbors as "motivated primarily by their speculation and fears" and
stated that the record lacked "substantial evidence that the proposed
center . . . will have a direct and immediate adverse effect upon the
health, safety and welfare of the community."' 133
In Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,13 4 a church parish
house established a center for youths with drug problems. The New
York Supreme Court held such use valid under an ordinance allowing
the use of buildings for religious purposes. 135 The court noted that
other religious organizations were addressing the problem of drug
127. In re Garden City Jewish Center, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 157 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
128. See Note, supra note 78, at 293; Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63
Misc. 2d 978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v.
Downer, 59 Misc. 2d 387, 302 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Diocese of Central New
York v. Schwarzer, 23 Misc. 2d 515, 199 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
129. Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 324 N.Y.S.2d 66
(Sup. Ct. 1970). Even though the center was to be run by a separate, but affiliated
nonprofit corporate entity, the court found the day care center was a religious activity
and needed no additional permit. Id. at 981-82, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71. The court also
based the ruling on the established state policy favoring the creation of day care centers.
Id. at 980, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
130. North Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman, 105 A.D.2d 702, 481 N.Y.S.2d
142 (App. Div. 1984) (Sunday classes in music, folk dancing and dramatics open to
academy pupils and children not enrolled in the academy).
131. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 981, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70. The court recognized that
defining religious activity is difficult, but a day care center was clearly "within the ambit
of religious activity." Id. at 982, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 71. See Wegman, 105 A.D.2d 702,
705, 481 N.Y.S.2d 142, 145 ("religious and education institutions enjoy a constitution-
ally protected status which severely limits applications of normal zoning standards"
(quoting Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d at 981, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 70)).
132. 105 A.D.2d 702, 418 N.Y.S.2d 142.
133. Id. at 706, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
134. 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
135. Id. at 315-16, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
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abuse and recognized that, because a breakdown of spiritual and moral
value is implicit in drug abuse, drug abuse's moral allienation seems
explicitly a religious problem.' 36 The court held that the drug program
was an effort by the congregation to meet religious duties to heal and to
help others in need.'37 The court was unconcerned with the facts that
some of the participants were from surrounding communities and that
the program was to be run by a local hospital.'38 As the court noted:
If a use of church property is a religious use, why should it matter
that those of other religions or beliefs will benefit, or that the
church engages in contracts or permits specialists or professional
people on its premises to execute the religious use? The thought
of limiting benefit struggles against the strong modern current
of pan-ecumenicalism, and frustrates the desirable mutual
interchange of use of religious institutions in our society
today .... 139
Despite the court's broad view, it did recognize that some activities
might present such a danger to the community that the state's interest
would have to overrule the religious use. 40 In order to prove that its
interest is paramount, the state must show convincingly that the reli-
gious use will cause a "direct and immediate adverse impact"'' upon
the community. The court stated that community fears would not suf-
fice and imposed a requirement of accommodation whenever possible.
As the Slevin decision was to ultimately rest on determinations of
fact,' 4 2 the court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
dangers were "unreasonable," and in need of "reasonable regulation
weighed in relation to the total safety, health and morals of the
community." 143
In sum, at least four different approaches exist to enable courts to
attempt to define religious uses and reconcile competing fundamental
136. Id. at 317, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
137. Id. at 317-18, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46. "The drug center program seeks to
discharge a spiritual duty felt by clergymen and their congregants. . the drug center
program is a "specific effort to be obedient to Christ's command to heal." Id. at 317,
319 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (quoting Rt. Rev. Jonathan G. Sherman, Episcopal Bishop of Long
Island).
138. Id. at 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 319, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
141. Walker, supra note 78, at 177.
142. Slevin, 66 Misc.2d at 321, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
143. Id. at 329, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
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interests. Although New York presents the broadest view, one author
notes that "most uses held to not qualify as 'religious use' . . . seem
more remote from traditional concepts of church and religion than
those held to qualify."" Even if a use does not meet the standard
employed to determine a protected religious use of property, however,
it may qualify as a valid accessory use of religious property.
B. Accessory Use
Accessory uses 145  are those uses usually accompanying and
subordinate to a particular property's primary use. 14 6 An accessory
use generally must be one which is "customarily incident" to a related
primary use. 147 In addition, the subsidiary use typically must be on the
same lot as the principal use.148 The chief benefit of accessory status is
that once a use has been defined as accessory to an already established
religious primary use, no additional approval or permit is necessary.' 49
Therefore, to determine whether a given use is accessory, the primary
use of the property must be identified first.15° Because of the special
status given to religious entities in our society,"'5 there must be flexibil-
ity in defining what constitutes an accessory use for religious institu-
tions. A majority of jurisdictions permit a wide range of accessory uses
144. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3D 197 (1975). Walker wishes to eliminate precisely this
approach because it fails to recognize that nontraditional religious beliefs are also pro-
tected under the first amendment. He suggests that courts look first to the sincerity of
the religious belief and then balance the use against any valid objections. If necessary,
regulating the use to lessen its adverse impact would ensue. See Walker, supra note 78,
at 183.
145. Accessory uses are known also as incidental uses. For a general discussion of
what constitutes an accessory use of religious property, see Annot., 11 A.L.R. 4th 1084
(1982).
Although some ordinances explicitly delineate what is to be considered an acceptable
accessory, other boards are content to allow the courts to define the term. Note, Zon-
ing: Accessory Uses and the Meaning of the Customary Requirement, 56 B.U. L. REV.
542 (19760.
146. 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, § 74.15, at 416-17 (1975); An-
not., 11 A.L.R. 4th 1084, 1086 (1982).
147. 1 R. ANDERSON supra note 79, § 12.26, at 148 (2d ed. 1976). See 3 N. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 146, § 74.08, at 405; 11 A.L.R. 4th 1084, 1086.
148. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 79, § 12.26, at 148.
149. Id.
150. Beit Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 447, 418 A.2d 82, 86
(1979).
151. City of Minneapolis v. Church Universal and Triumphant, 339 N.W.2d 880,
889 (Minn. 1983).
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for established churches.
1 52
A primary difficulty in determining what is a valid accessory use
centers on defining "customary" incidental use. 15 3  The problem is
compounded because, under the first amendment, secular entities
should not be able to determine what uses are "customary," and there-
fore acceptable, for religious entities.1 54 To avoid this problem, courts
often have considered future trends in determining whether a given use
is accessory. 155 Activities accepted by courts as valid accessory uses of
ecclesiastical property have included residential uses,15 6 educational
uses, 57 recreational uses 1 58 and parking facilities.159
1. Residential Use
Typical cases concerning residential use of buildings by religious en-
152. Id.
153. For a detailed discussion on defining "customary use" in zoning cases see
Note, supra note 145. See also 11 A.L.R. 4th 1084, 1086-87.
154. BeitHavurah, 177 Conn. at 445, 418 A.2d at 87; See also U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
155. 11 A.L.R. 4th 1084, 1087.
156. Belt Havurah, 177 Conn. 440, 418 A.2d 82; Jewish Reconstructionist Syna-
gogue, Inc. v. Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y. 2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1975) (holding guest house on synagogue grounds occupied by
rabbi was a valid accessory use). The court said that a setback requirement could have
been imposed if it had been the result of a balancing of interests, but because no balanc-
ing had taken place the setback requirement was invalid.
157. Twin-City Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 50 Ill. App. 3d 924, 365
N.E.2d 1381 (1977) (lot across the street from established church to be used for Sunday
school classes, fellowship meetings and other activities was acceptable within area zoned
for churches and accessory buildings).
The seminal case concerning religious and accessory use of property is Diocese of
Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956)
(holding a school to be a valid accessory use). But see Damascus Community Church v.
Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980) (ordinance evidenced legis-
lative intent to keep separate the criteria for granting conditional use permits for
churches and parochial schools). Because California and Oregon view the application
of zoning laws to religious uses so differently from the majority of states, accessory uses
usually are construed strictly in these states. See, e.g., id.
158. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185
(1968). But see Christian Retreat Center v. Board of County Comm'rs, 28 Or. App.
673, 560 P.2d 1100 (1977) (church retreat and day camp held to be not accessory uses).
159. Mahrt v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 5, 142 N.E.2d 567,
afl'd, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 24, 142 N.E.2d 678 (1955). But see East Baptist Church of
Denver, Inc. v. Klein, 175 Colo. 168, 487 P.2d 549 (1971) (parking buses on property is
not an incidental, customary use establishing a valid accessory use).
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tities involve monasteries 1'" and housing for religious devotees and
leaders. 6 ' The court, in City of Minneapolis v. Church Universal and
Triumphant,16 2 held that a monastery was an accessory use, in part
because the monastery's purpose was to aid in the teaching and minis-
try of the church.16 3
In Beit Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals,'6 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut struck down restrictions on overnight use of a syna-
gogue's property, reasoning that sleeping accommodations were a nec-
essary accessory to the religious fellowship of the faith.'6 5 In
determining that the use was accessory, the court noted that "nontradi-
tional synagogue[s] had nontraditional needs."' 166
2. Educational and Recreational Use
One court has determined a coffee house to be a valid accessory use.
In Synod of Chesapeake, Inc. v. City of Newark,167 a campus ministry
provided services, religious fellowship meetings and a coffeehouse that
served, on a nonprofit basis, coffee and snacks. The ministry also spon-
sored both religious and secular films.168 The court noted that church-
sponsored coffeehouses were becoming prevalent throughout the coun-
try, and that all worthy contemporary church groups perform nonreli-
gious functions. 6 9 The court accepted as accessory those activities
specifically tailored to the needs of that particular community but not
typical in the sense of being comprised solely of traditional worship.
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Ashton,17 a lighted recreational
field was found to be an acceptable accessory use. The court cited Dio-
160. City of Minneapolis v. Church Universal and Triumphant, 339 N.W.2d 880
(Minn. 1983).
161. Id, See also 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 147, § 12.26, at 148.
162. Church Universal and Triumphant, 339 N.W.2d 880.
163. Id. at 888-89.
164. 177 Conn. 440, 418 A.2d 82 (1979).
165. Id. at 448-49, 418 A.2d at 87.
166. Id. The court did examine other synagogues' practices with regard to over-
night accommodations. It was not dissuaded by the fact that few synagogues used facil-
ities overnight, and even those that did use overnight accommodations used them solely
on the weekends. Id.
167. 254 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1969).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 613-14.
170. 92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185 (1968).
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cese of Rochester171 for the principle that churches encompass more
than just the traditional church building where religious services are
conducted. 172 The court stated that recreational uses were "an integral
part of the church program and [were] sufficiently connected with the
church itself that the use of this property for recreational purposes was
permissible."' 73 Although these activities were "an official part of [the
church's] program of worship," the court stated that it was not imply-
ing that a church would have absolute free reign in its use of property
merely because there existed some relationship between the activities
and a church purpose.' 74
The criteria courts use to determine whether an activity is a valid
accessory to church use thus includes the nature of the use, its relation
to primary church purposes, and the frequency of similar uses at other
religious institutions. None of these factors alone is determinative.
The court will instead look to the individual circumstances of each case
in determining whether a valid accessory use exists.175
V. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
Under the view held by a majority of states, zoning provisions affect-
ing the free exercise of religion should receive stricter scrutiny in order
to prevent infringement upon constitutionally protected activities.176
In fact, some states require a compelling state interest coupled with the
least restrictive means of regulation, if restrictions are to be placed on
the church. 177 Courts, however, have varied in their determination of
what is required to trigger this heightened scrutiny. Some courts have
171. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
172. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 92 Idaho at 574, 448 P.2d at 188.
173. Id. at 575, 448 P.2d at 189.
174. Id. The court went on to discuss whether night baseball games constituted a
nuisance. Id. at 576, 448 P.2d at 190. Using principles of accommodation, the court
limited the hours when games could be played, and thereby harmonized the conflicting
needs of the church and community. Id. at 578, 448 P.2d at 192.
175. Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d
15 (1956).
176. See Walker, supra note 78; Note, supra note 78, at 294; Slevin v. Long Island
Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1971); City of
Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982) (citing
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), for the holding that "any incidental bur-
den on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified [only] by a 'compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's constitutional power...'")
177. See Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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required only a showing of "religious purpose," 17 8 while others de-
mand that an essential or "fundamental religious tenet" 179 be impli-
cated before strict scrutiny will be applied. These courts also require a
compelling state interest to justify governmental restrictions on the ex-
ercise of religion.
Regardless of which standard they apply, courts recognize that the
"power of regulation hasn't been altogether obliterated," it has just
been "severely curtailed."' ° Even under the strictest standard, reli-
gious uses are permitted to exist unless there is a "convincing showing
of a direct and immediate adverse effect upon the health, safety or wel-
fare of the community."'' Many courts are moving toward a balanc-
ing of interests, requiring accommodation when there is a clash of
fundamental interests.18 2 If, after assessing the religious belief,"' 3 ex-
178. See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d
849; Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1956).
179. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lake-
wood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1985). In Lakewood the
court stated that if a fundamental tenet was found to be implicated then the state would
have to show a compelling interest, and use the least restrictive means available to
achieve the desired end. Id. at 305. To determine whether the standard had been met,
the court examined the "centrality of the burdened religious observance to the believer's
faith," the "nature of the religious observance" and the "nature of the burden placed on
the religious observance." Id. at 306. The court found no infringement in a zoning
ordinance which prohibited the construction of churches in residential districts. Id. at
309.
The Lakewood analysis is inapplicable to that being discussed in this article. The
significant difference is that this article permits religious entities an accessory use of
already validly established religious organizations. This author believes that the use of
already established property changes the analysis. One commentator believes the Lake-
wood decision is not reflective of Supreme Court doctrine on the free exercise clause.
See Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for Expanded Free
Exercise Protection, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1984). The author calls for protection of
"religiously motivated" conduct under a least restrictive means analysis. Id. at 1135.
Under that test, the court would first be required to determine whether a protected right
has been infringed. Id. at 1155. Next, the court would examine the governmental inter-
est and decide whether the least restrictive means had been utilized to achieve the goals.
Id. at 1158-59.
180. Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 496, 239 N.E.2d 891,
896, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 303 (1968).
181. See Trinity United Methodist Church v. City of Kingston Zoning Bd. of Ap-
peals (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Spec. Term. Cal. No. 90, May 27, 1983) (citing Westchester
Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 494, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303).
182. Islamic Society v, Foley, 96 A.D.2d 536, 464 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div. 1983).
In Foley, the court acknowledged the need for flexibility and noted that churches were
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amining the community's objections 184 and ensuring that the commu-
nity's reasons for restrictive zoning provisions are not pretextual, 185
there is still a conflict between free exercise of religion and substantial
governmental interests, the court can order regulations minimizing the
effects on the religious practice. 186 In one view, the local zoning board
has an affirmative duty to suggest measures that accommodate the
planned religious use and do not excessively increase the religious insti-
tution's costs, while concurrently mitigating the detrimental effects the
proposed use would have on the health, safety and welfare of the sur-
rounding community.18 1
VI. SHELTERING THE HOMELESS: VALID RELIGIOUS OR
ACCESSORY USE OF CHURCH FACILITIES
The question whether shelters for the homeless constitute a permissi-
ble religious or accessory use under zoning ordinances has not yet been
widely addressed. The few state courts that have tackled the problem
have answered the question affirmatively.' 8 These courts have recog-
not to be judged by the same standards as commercial establishments. Id. at 537, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 845.
183. See Walker, supra note 78, at 183. Walker would implement a two part test,
questioning only the sincerity of the belief and then balancing the merits of objections to
determine whether regulations to lessen the impact of the use are appropriate. Id.
Some courts reject inquiring into the "particular tenets" of religious beliefs because of
the principles of separation of church and state. See Belt Havurah, 177 Conn. 440, 418
A.2d 82. See also Comment, supra note 94, at 600. According to one commentator, the
Supreme Court apparently only requires "some threshold assessment of the religious
significance to the believer of the burdened practice." See Comment, supra note 179, at
1147.
184. American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pious v. Schwab, 68 A.D. 2d 646, 417
N.Y.S.2d 991 (1979).
185. Id. at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994. See Walker, supra note 78, at 181. Careful
examination of reasons will prevent infringement of religious practices. Id. Walker
notes that the court was concerned about public officials "mask[ing] the real grounds of
their decisions by citing concerns of increased traffic or fire hazards." Id. The court in
Schwab remanded and directed that a reasonable compromise be developed if irreconcil-
able conflicts existed. Id.
186. See Walker, supra note 78, at 183; Belt Havurah, 177 Conn. at 437, 418 A.2d at
79.
187. Islamic Soc'y, 96 A.D.2d at 537, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
188. See Trinity United Methodist Church (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Special Term, Cal.
No. 90, May 27, 1983); City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510 (S.D. 1983); St.
John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935
(1983).
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nized the problem of defining "religious use," and have noted that such
use embraces far more than merely religious worship.1 89 These courts
also have stated that the issue's complexity necessitates an ad hoe de-
termination, based on individual facts and circumstances.' 90 If "reli-
gious use" of property is defined as activity motivated by religious
purposes, sheltering the homeless should qualify, given the close rela-
tionship between the activity, providing shelter, and the religious doc-
trines mandating this conduct.19 '
It is suggested that in determining whether a religious purpose is
involved, the courts should look to the purpose of the activity in light
of the rules and practices of that particular religious organization.' 92
The court, in St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken,
stated that "plaintiffs have persuasively argued that housing the home-
less in a church is a religious use sanctioned by centuries of scriptures
and practice. The zoning power may not be constitutionally used to
preclude a church from exercising its religious function of providing a
189. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 512. The court then recognized that religious use
often had been construed to mean religious purpose. Id.
190. See Trinity United Methodist Church (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Special Term, Cal.
No. 90, May 27, 1983). See also Kahler, 334 N.W.2d at 512. In Kahler, the court
remanded for further findings of fact to determine whether a mission constituted a reli-
gious use. The court was unable to determine "whether the mission is directly affiliated
or supported by an organized religion, whether the religious leaders referred to are actu-
ally ordained ministers of recognized denominations, and [could not] determine from
the record the nature, frequency and content of religious services said to be held in the
mission." Id. at 512. It appears that the court felt that either some or all of these
factors would help determine whether the provision of shelter by the mission consti-
tuted a religious use. In other jurisdictions, the courts might not even be inclined to do
more than a cursory examination of the religious belief, fearing unconstitutional in-
fringement on first amendment rights.
191. See St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. at 418, 479 A.2d
at 939; Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 319, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 844. In discussing the Slevin case,
one commentator explained that by finding the church to be concerned intimately with
the human spirit and morals, the "court did not merely find that the counseling of drug
users falls within the parameters of religious use as defined in Bates, but that this is a
religious purpose directly related to all doctrines. Any activity so directly related to this
religious purpose must be classified as a religious use." (emphasis added). Note, supra
note 78, at 298. It follows that sheltering the homeless also is directly related to reli-
gious doctrine. In sheltering the homeless, churches are providing basic human necessi-
ties, essential for human survival. Unless these fundamental needs are met, spiritual
and moral needs can not begin to be addressed.
192. Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 317, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 944. See Note, supra note 78, at
297.
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sanctuary for the homeless."19 The court acknowledged that the
church was "fulfilling [its] religious obligations and exercising a tradi-
tional religious function in utilizing the basement of St. John's to shel-
ter the homeless poor." 194 Because sheltering the homeless is a central
tenet of Judeo-Christian faith,' 9 5 any refusal to allow the use of reli-
gious facilities for sheltering the homeless results in the violation of an
"essential requirement" of the faiths.19 6
Most courts are reluctant to probe too deeply into the nature of the
religious belief,1 97 preferring a threshold assessment of the burdened
practice's significance to the individual believer.198 Following the Sle-
vin approach, recipients of aid need not be of the same faith to benefit
from a religious use of property. Therefore, the religious affiliation of
shelter beneficiaries is not important in determining whether the use is
religious in nature.1 99
Whether providing shelter for the homeless is central to the religion
is especially important in determining what constitutes a valid acces-
sory use of religious property. In Beit Havurah v. Zoning Board of
193. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. at 418, 479 A.2d at
939.
194. Id. at 416, 479 A.2d at 937. As will be discussed later in this section, the St.
John's court ultimately found that the shelter was a valid accessory use of the church.
195. See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text (tracing the history of sanctuary
and protection provided by the church). "Sheltering the homeless and caring for the
poor has consistently been a church function carried out for centuries by religious per-
sons. It is among one of the basic mandates in the Judeo-Christian heritage." St. John's
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. at 416, 479 A.2d at 937.
196. This appears to be the standard required in the Lakewood case. Lakewood
Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 82 (1983). One can argue, as was done in Lakewood, that
the zoning ordinance does not infringe on the free exercise of religion, it merely affects
economic factors and the location of worship. This article, however, focuses on already
established religious edifices. Therefore, because of the extreme burden placed on the
free exercise clause, if the use were to be denied, the impact on these organizations
would be far more than incidental. Unlike choosing another location to build, denying
the religious use here would force the church to make an unacceptable choice-to give
up the religiously mandated activity or to relocate an already validly established church.
It should be noted that most courts do not read the free exercise requirement as restric-
tively as did the Lakewood court. See generally Comment, supra note 179, at 1131;
Walker, supra note 78, at 129.
197. See Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 319, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
198. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Comment, supra note 179, at 1147.
199. Comment, supra note 179, at 1147.
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Appeals,2°° the court held that once a use has been designated as per-
missible in a given zone. the immunity extended to churches will be
extended to accessory uses. The court reasoned that after a site has
been designated suitable for religious use, decisions as to what consti-
tutes such a use more appropriately should be left to the congregation
rather than zoning boards or courts.20
1
Logically, providing shelter for the homeless should be a valid acces-
sory use of an already established religious structure because shelters
meet the traditional indicia required of an accessory use.20 2 Generally,
to qualify as an accessory use, the use must be on the same lot and in
furtherance of the primary purpose, with the nature of the additional
use customarily incident to the primary function.203 Because churches
have established shelters for the homeless by converting the basements
of their existing houses of worship,2°4 the traditional zoning require-
ment that the accessory use be on the same lot clearly has been met.20 5
Similarly, because most church space typically is devoted to worship,
and regular services presumably will continue to be held, the base-
ment's use as a shelter meets the requirement that the accessory use be
subordinate to the primary use.206
A more difficult question concerns the nature of the alleged acces-
sory use. In particular, questions arise regarding whether the use is
customarily incident to religious facilities; the shelter's relation to the
primary use; and the frequency of similar uses among other faiths.20 7
The courts in both Trinity Methodist and St. John's recognized the
longstanding duty to provide for the homeless.2 8 The St. John's court
200. 177 Conn. 440, 418 A.2d 82 (1979). See also Comment, supra note 94, at 602.
201. Id.
202. See Trinity United Methodist Church (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Special Term, Cal.
No. 90, May 27, 1983); St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. 414,
479 A.2d 935 (1983). For a more detailed explanation of accessory uses, see supra notes
145-75 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
204. Trinity United Methodist Church (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Special Term, Cal. No.
90, May 27, 1983). See also supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text.
205. An interesting issue is posed with regard to accessory uses and same lot re-
quirements. A few cases have said that facilities across the street fall within the ambit
of accessory lot requirements. The question becomes how far away a use can be while
still claiming to be accessory. A wholly different issue, of course,is the question of why
the accessory use must be on the same lot at all.
206. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
208. Trinity United Methodist Church (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Special Term, Cal. No.
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recognized the "centuries old church tradition of sanctuary for those in
need of shelter and aid," and found that St. John's and its parishioners
were engaging in the free exercise of their religion by providing shelter
to the homeless. 20 9 The court held that the City of Hoboken could not
"constitutionally use its zoning authority to prohibit that free
exercise.
' ' 21
In addition to recognizing the church's historical role in building
shelter, courts have acknowledged a growing trend among religious or-
ganizations to make similar use of existing religious structures in an
effort to alleviate the growing problem of homelessness.21 1 The St.
John's court found this to satisfy the requirement that the use be cus-
tomarily incident to other religious entities.2 12 In light of the nature of
the use, its historical and religious basis, and the growing trend toward
utilizing extra space in religious buildings for sheltering the homeless,
such shelters would constitute a valid accessory use of religious prop-
erty already permitted in a given zone.
Even if sheltering the homeless is considered to be a valid religious
or accessory use of church property, it is not immune from all govern-
mental inquiry or regulation.2 13 The religion's interest in sheltering
90, May 27, 1983) (recognizing the "historic role of the church in providing for the poor
and needy"); St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 418, 479
A.2d 935, 937 (1983) ("The concept of sanctuary has been a strong element of religious
tradition from Moses to the New Testament.") (citing affidavit of Rev. Felske).
209. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. at 420, 479 A.2d at
938.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 418, 479 A.2d at 937. "Throughout history the churches have carried
out [the] Biblical mandate to aid the poor and the helpless. Sanctuary became such a
strong religious tradition it was recognized in Roman, medieval and English common
law. During the Middle Ages every church was a potential sanctuary," Id. (citing
affidavit of Rev. Felske).
212. As the court noted:
More recently churches and synagogues throughout this country have opened their
doors to the homeless and the oppressed. Although precise statistics are not avail-
able on the number of homeless shelters, these include hundreds from coast to
coast. Over 50 churches and synagogues in New York City sheltered the homeless
this past winter. Congregations in San Francisco, Atlanta, Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Hartford, Jersey City, and Chicago opened their doors to the poor.
195 N.J. Super. at 418, 479 A.2d at 937 (quoting affidavit of Rev. Felske).
213. See City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510 (S.D. 1983). The court
recognized the "wide latitude of expression" given to religious conduct, but cautioned
that the public did have an interest in maintenance of health and safety, along with
"traffic and parking problems, noise, litter and related problems." Id. at 513. It then
remanded for further factual inquiry into the nature of the use. Apparently, South
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the homeless must be weighed against the state's interest in denying the
use.2 14 In determining whether the state's interest outweighs the right
to free exercise of religion, most courts have found annoyances or fi-
nancial detriment to the community insufficient to override the reli-
gious interest.21 5 If real dangers to the community are posed by the
religious use, and cannot be mitigated, however, the least restrictive
restraint may be justified.216 When determining whether danger to the
community exists in a particular case, the reasons advanced by the
state must be examined carefully to ensure that the arguments are not
advanced merely as a pretext for preventing the use.2t 7 In addition,
mere speculation or fears are not acceptable reasons for excluding the
use. Zoning powers cannot be used to chill free exercise rights.218
Applying rigid legal analysis to the homelessness problem is difficult
because realities often are distorted by the fears of the community.
Neighbors often fear a shelter will cause a drop in property values,
2 19
and will encourage loitering and "other unsavory activities" in the
community.220 It is unclear, however, whether the "not in my neigh-
Dakota allows traffic and community inconvenience to be factored into the balancing
equation.
214. See supra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 320, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947. Connecticut, how-
ever, does include factors such as traffic, noise and inconvenience in the balancing equa-
tion. This is done with the provision that religious uses are to be protected, and the
state interests must meet a more severe test than mere rationality review in order to
justify abridging the church's free exercise rights.
216. Id. at 320, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 948. The court stated:
Where the religious use may be so fraught with danger or peril to the community
because of the particular use sought, the detriment to the community can outweigh
the religious consideration. For instance, dynamite or contagion carry different
weights than nuisance or financial loss ... the matter turns on a substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, peace or general welfare of the community.
Id. at 320, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947. It should again be emphasized that these determina-
tions must be made on a case by case basis.
217. American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pious v. Schwab, 68 A.D. 2d 646, 649,
417 N.Y.S. 2d 991, 993 (1979). The court in Schwab alluded to the possibility that the
stated concerns of traffic increases and other problems were advanced to mask commu-
nity fears about potential annoyance. Id. at 650, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994. See also Walker,
supra note 78, at 180-82. Walker notes that Schwab represents "one of the more deci-
sive applications of the free exercise clause within the zoning context." Id. at 181-82.
218. Schwab, 68 A.D. 2d at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
219. See Homelessness in America, supra note 2.
220. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 511. The trial court concluded that "loitering, litter-
ing, panhandling and other unsavory activities" had increased in the neighborhood sur-
rounding the Mission since it opened its doors. Id at 511. The South Dakota Supreme
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borhood" attitude is based on real or imagined dangers to the commu-
nity. Newsweek magazine reports that most of the homeless pose no
danger to others.22 ' According to literature on homelessness, most
homeless are seen as victims, not victimizers, and pose no real physical
danger to others in the neighborhood.222  As more individuals, chil-
dren and families become unable to make ends meet, this will become
increasingly true.
Despite the many economic casualties, it seems clear that some por-
tion of homeless individuals do suffer from mental illness. If these indi-
viduals pose a threat to the community, then they will do so whether
they are on the streets all the time or only part of the time. Vagrancy
laws can combat the danger these people present, as can laws prohibit-
ing antisocial conduct. For these individuals, the solution, of course, is
not only shelter, but treatment. Conversely, if the homeless pose no
direct threat to the community, then, under the most stringent stan-
dard, shelters cannot be excluded merely because of inconveniences to
the community. A "direct and immediate" adverse impact must be
present.223 Although a factual determination by a judge or jury would
be involved here, it is unlikely that loitering or littering would rise to
the level of seriousness the courts require.224
Another approach to the competing interests involves a balancing
test to determine whether the religious use of facilities for shelters
should outweigh legitimate governmental zoning interests, as opposed
to community safety interests.225 Jurisdictions applying this approach
often require attempts at accommodation prior to any ordering of in-
terests.226 Even under a standard that calls for balancing governmen-
Court remanded, however, for a determination of, among other things, whether the
mission constituted a religious use. Id. at 512-13.
221. Newsweek claims "[flew are dangerous to anyone but themselves." Homeless
in America, supra note 2, at 22.
222. See supra notes 14-42 and accompanying text.
223. See Trinity United Methodist Church (Sup. Ct. Ulster City Special Term, Cal.
No. 90, May 27, 1983).
224. This, however, would not mean an action for nuisance is barred. Residents
could seek to enjoin the use as a nuisance. If the court determined the use a nuisance, it
would then inquire whether the nuisance could be abated. If abatement was not possi-
ble, the court would issue an injunction against the use.
225. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7-8, 639 P.2d 1358,
1362 (1982).
226. Id. at 9, 639 P.2d at 1363. See also Islamic Soc'y v. Foley, 96 A.D.2d 536, 464
N.Y.S.2d 844, 845. The court gave the local zoning board an affirmative duty to devise
measures accommodating the planned religious use.
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tal zoning and religious objectives, shelters should be allowed to
operate as either a religious or an accessory use. Although residents
near a church probably have expectations that the church will be used
for services, festivals and bingo, but not for shelters for the homeless,
any weighing of the gravity of harms likely would result in allowing the
shelter. Any inconvenience residents might face is trivial when con-
trasted with the perils shelter occupants would have to face if forced
back into city streets.2
27
Though shelters may pose legitimate dangers to the surrounding
community, these adverse effects could be mitigated by the implemen-
tation of reasonable regulations.228 Such regulations may include valid
health and safety laws,"' as well s reasonable occupancy require-
ments.230 The regulations, however, should not be so stringent that the
church would be defeated in its mission to assist the homeless.23 1
227. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 421, 479 A.2d
935, 939 (1983). The court balanced interests to determine whether a preliminary in-
junction should be issued. It appears that the same result would be obtained when
interests are balanced to determine whether a religious use should prevail.
Another argument advanced favoring shelters is that they actually could remove the
homeless from the streets, thereby alleviating perceived problems in the community. A
counterargument is that shelters bring an influx of homeless to a particular neighbor-
hood, thus increasing the actual number of homeless on those streets. The residents'
fears may be unfounded. First, because church shelters tend to be small, the number of
homeless in the neighborhood would not drastically increase. Additionally, reasonable
regulations may be implemented to mitigate deleterious effects on the community. Be-
cause the interests of the homeless, the government and the community are all best
served by providing shelter and removing the homeless from city streets, any balancing
test must include all three interests.
228. See, e.g., Beit Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 418 A.2d 82
(1979); St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935
(1983); Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319-20, 319
N.Y.S.2d 937, 947-48 (1971).
229. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 195 N.J. Super. at 421, 479 A.2d at
939.
230. Id. The church conceded that a reasonable occupancy limit for the basement
would be 20 persons and the court ordered that the maximum number of occupants be
reduced to that limit. Id.
231. As the court in St. John's stated:
The requirements should be appropriate to a shelter for the homeless. The church
should not have to meet health and safety requirements imposed upon a commer-
cial establishment such as a motel. Moreover, the laws and regulations should be
interpreted in a reasonable and common sense manner bearing in mind that overly
strict enforcement might force the shelter to close, leaving its occupants in a far
worse state than remaining in a crowded shelter.
195 NJ. Super. at 421, 479 A.2d at 939.
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VII. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Because churches partially fill a void by providing shelters, the state
should not erect obstacles preventing this use of religious property.
The current method of case by case adjudication is expensive and cre-
ates disincentives to provide shelter. Because providing shelter for the
homeless is mandated by fundamental religious tenets, it should qualify
as a valid religious or accessory use and be protected under the free
exercise clause of the first amendment. In addition, broadly drafted
zoning ordinances may chill charitable organizations in the exercise of
their first amendment rights. Therefore, a compelling state interest
should be required in order to restrict the use of church property for
sheltering the homeless. A presumption of valid religious or accessory
use should exist until danger to the community is proven by clear and
convincing evidence.2 32 This standard would ensure that a commu-
nity's pretextual objections do not form the basis of zoning decisions,
and it would shift to the city the burden of showing a legitimate danger
to the community. Shifting the burden would alleviate the shelter
providers of the burdensome task of showing that the shelter would not
present a danger to the community. This new standard would both
adequately protect community safety concerns and ensure that reli-
gious providers of shelters are not chilled in their free exercise of reli-
gion by prior restraints on that exercise.
In recognition of some of the inconveniences to the community that
may be attendant to sheltering the homeless, providers may impose
regulations on those who use the shelters.2 33 To minimize potential
problems, shelters could establish rules regarding check-in times and
loitering outside the shelter. Because of limited funding, small staffs
and a variety of other reasons, some shelters are open only at night.
2 34
Residents may fear loitering and congregation of homeless individuals
when they leave the shelter for the day.2 3 Some communities have
232. A clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate given the fact that a
compelling interest is necessary in order to restrict this religious activity.
233. See generally THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984). See also
Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 320, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 948 (recognizing neighborhood concern
over drug treatment center in the community, church implemented security measures,
supervision and urine tests for program participants).
234. Levine, Service Programs for the Homeless Mentally Ill, reprinted in THE
HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 175 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984). Levine also believes the work
ethic and community resistance are factors contributing to an "evening only" policy at
some shelters.
235. See City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510 (S.D. 1983).
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established drop-in centers to provide a place for the homeless to go
during the time shelters are closed.23 6 Shelter providers and the com-
munity, working in unison rather than in opposition, could develop
regulations that would alleviate community concerns while providing
desperately needed shelter for the homeless.
The homeless crisis has grown to such proportions that religious or-
ganizations attempting to address the problem should not be deterred
by the erection of zoning barriers restricting the establishment of shel-
ters for the homeless. Government entities experiencing funding cut-
backs are unable, or unwilling, to provide the necessities to those in
need of shelter. Municipalities must recognize that by providing shel-
ter for the homeless, religious organizations also are fulfilling a desper-
ately needed public service. Municipalities should sanction this vital
service by recognizing that establishing a shelter for the homeless is a
valid religious or accessory use, needing no additional approval, and
subject only to reasonable regulation for health, safety or a compelling
state interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Churches are motivated by the tenets of their faiths to provide shel-
ters. Provision of shelter by churches has existed since Biblical times.
Because this duty is central to the religious beliefs of the Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition, it should qualify as a religious use of property. The first
amendment usually guarantees governmental deference to religious or-
ganizations with respect to regulating the uses of property already des-
ignated as ecclesiastical within the community. Under the majority
view, religious use is defined broadly to include activities that are moti-
vated by a religious purpose. Accessory use is related, but subordinate
to the primary religious use. Some courts look to how customary the
accessory use is when determining whether the activity is a valid inci-
dental use of a religious edifice. Other courts, however, are willing to
accept even nontraditional uses if they are central to that organiza-
tion's religious tenets. Therefore, it follows that the provision of shel-
ter for the homeless within religious buildings already so designated
236. HOMBS & SNYDER, supra note 2. In addition, traditional legal resources
would still be available as a last resort. Although arresting the homeless for loitering or
harassment is obviously a less than ideal remedy, and is not a long term solution to the
problem, it does provide a method for ensuring that disruption to the community is
minimized. Of course, this avenue only should be utilized after regulations, drop in
centers and other attempts at accommodation have failed.
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under the local ordinance is valid either as a religious or accessory use
of the property.
Emergency shelters can provide only temporary, stop-gap measures
to alleviate complex structural problems. Although churches are effec-
tive providers of shelter, they cannot be the only providers. Churches
have limited resources available to provide for those in need of shelter.
If the crisis of homelessness is to be eradicated, coordination between
religious organizations and local and federal governmental agencies is
imperative. Only when a concerted effort is made to understand the
underlying causes of homelessness will there be progress in sheltering
those for whom the last address was a street grate.
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